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ABSTRACT

Curnett, Brian T. M.S., Purdue University, May 2015. Password Strength Analysis: User
Coping Mechanisms in Password Selection. Major Professor: Melissa Dark.

The security that passwords provide could be seriously flawed due to the way people cope
with having to memorize and recall their passwords. The National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) standard that is used to measure the password strength, known as
entropy, is designed for a single use and does not consider that users may choose to keep
parts of their password across password changes. This study shows that a portion of users
keep some information from previous passwords across changes. These habits which will
be called coping mechanisms that over time serve to erode the protection provided by
passwords past the minimum level of security provided by the password policy which can
place both individuals and enterprises into danger. This is made even more apparent with
data breaches become a common pKHQRPHQRQLQSUHVHQWGD\OLIHVHUYLQJWRH[SRVHXVHU¶V
password to the world. It was found that the minimum level of security can no longer be
provided after one disclosure of passwords in the Comprehensive 8 password policy, and
after two disclosures in passwords in the Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policy. Coping
mechanisms are most prevalent in password policies that have many requirements placed
on users. The Comprehensive 8 policy showed the most coping followed by the Blacklist
Hard and Basic 16 policies.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an introduction and overview of the research project. The
introduction includes a background of the research, the significance of the research, the
research questions, assumption, limitations, delimitations, and the definitions of
terminology that will be used throughout.

1.1. Background
Even though passwords have been used for as long as people have needed
authentication, password strength analysis is an ongoing subject of research. There are
many viewpoints that can be taken on the security of passwords from the cryptographic
approach which has resulted in the hashing and salting of passwords to the network
administrators viewpoint of policies and standard requirements both becoming standard
practice (Klein, 1990 ; Zviran & Erlich, 2006). There is not currently a consensus within
WKHILHOGRILQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\DVWR³WKHEHVW´VHFXULW\PHFKDQLVP7KLVOHDGVWRPDQ\
arguments as to how to best protect many systems. Passwords still remain a relatively
inexpensive option for authentication and appear to be here to stay (Furnell & Zekri, 2006).
While passwords are a dominant authentication measure, weaknesses must be addressed in
order to protect all of the users whose information depends upon the security that
passwords provide. A password is only as strong as the user creates it to be. Weaknesses
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need to be examined in this creation process to see how much users cope with policy
restrictions by using known information, partially repeating past passwords, and using
easily identifiable patterns. Then these coping mechanisms can be examined to determine
how they can serve to erode the strength of password policies over time.

1.2. Significance
This study will concentrate on identifying the user habits that will be identified as
coping mechanisms. Most studies in the field of password strength analysis will take a
ODUJHVHWRISDVVZRUGVIURPDKDFNHU¶VOHDNHGOLVWEXWWKLVUHSUHVHQWVRQO\DVQDSVKRWLQ
WLPHRIDOOXVHUV¶SDVVZRUGVThis study is separated by the fact that it will analyze user
behavior across several iterations of time. This way, the evolution of the password will be
WUDFNHGWRVHHWKHSDVVZRUG¶VVXVFHSWLELOLW\JLYHQSULRUNQRZOHGJHE\DQDGYHUVDU\VXFKDV
a username and at least one password.

1.3. Statement of Purpose
This study will focus on identifying coping mechanisms that will remain within
XVHUV¶SDVVZRUGVDFURVVSDVVZRUGFKDQJH7KHVHFRSLQJPHFKDQLVPVZLOOEHDGGHGWRWKH
NIST model of entropy in an attempt to show the reduction of the effective key space that
these coping mechanisms will cause in the password as time progresses.
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1.4. Research Questions
1.

What is the prevalence of the coping mechanisms to which users engage by policy
and across iterations?
Using known information
Partial repetition
Easily identifiable patterns

2.

To what extent do users engage in coping mechanisms by policy and across
iterations?

3.

Do user coping mechanisms decrease the strength of password policies to such a
degree that the increase of security sought by the stringent policy is negated?

1.5. Assumptions
1.

The participants will respond truthfully during survey questions.

2.

At the start of each iteration all previous iterations passwords as well as the
username will become known.

1.6. Limitations
1.

Participants in this study live in the United States limiting the applicability across
the world. This may be relevant if coping habits are structured differently in other
languages and in other regions the primary language may not be English.

2.

The sample population of Mechanical Turk users may not be representative of the
average user as no demographic information is available for this population.
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3.

No personally identifiable information will be collected in this study. If any coping
mechanisms are based in using personally identifiable information, names,
addresses, birth dates, etc., these mechanisms will not be identified in this study.

1.7. Delimitations
1.

Only seven iterations of password changes will be collected.

2.

Passwords that are reused across accounts cannot be accounted for within the data
set.

1.8. Definitions
Coping Mechanisms ± Any behavior that serves to transfer information across password
changes or to reduce the effective key space of a password.
Basic 16 ± A password policy that asks the user to create a password of at least 16
characters in length (Kelley, et al., 2012).
Blacklist Hard ± A password policy that requires the user to create a password of at least 8
characters in length. This password is then checked against a dictionary blacklist
and if the password is on the dictionary blacklist it requires the user to choose a
new password (Kelley, et al., 2012).
Comprehensive 8 ± A password policy that requires a password to be at least 8 characters
long and contain at least 1 lowercase letter, 1 capital letter, 1 number, and 1 special
character (Kelley, et al., 2012).
Dictionary blacklist ± A collection of commonly used words that are banned from use as
passwords.
Entropy ± The standard unit of measurement for password strength.

5
Memorability ± The ease that a user can remember a password.
Password ± A set of characters known by a user and a system used to authenticate the
identity of a user.
Password Policies ± The minimum requirements placed on the user.
Post Coping Mechanism Entropy ± The entropy of a password after coping mechanisms
have been analyzed for their effect on security.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review examines a collection of disciplines in order to provide the sufficient
background information necessary for research into password strength analysis. This
chapter includes sections on the origin of passwords, entropy, human memory, and coping
mechanisms. The first section describes passwords¶ origins, associated terminology, and
metrics. The second gives a cognitive psychology perspective on how the human mind will
view passwords and the associated phenomena. The final section details the what, why,
and how we use coping mechanisms.

2.1. Passwords: An Origin and why we need them after all these years
Passwords can trace their lineage back to the ancient Roman military. Then known
as watchwords, passwords were used to verify the identity of troops (Eaton, 2011). The
UHDVRQZHQHHGSDVVZRUGVKDVQ¶WFKDQJHGLQ  \HDUV&RQILGHQWLDOLW\ ,QWHJULW\DQG
Availability, also known as the CIA spectrum in information security, are still needed to
insure that the person accessing a piece of information is indeed the person who should be
accessing the information. Passwords fit well within the CIA spectrum. Passwords help
keep data confidential by ensuring that only the people who know the secret, a password,
have access to the data. Passwords only work if they themselves
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remain confidential. By ensuring only people who have the appropriate clearance have
DFFHVVWRWKHGDWDVHUYHVWRNHHSWKHGDWD¶VLQWHJULW\LQWDFW3DVVZRUGVIXQFWLRQE\GHQ\LQJ
availability to people who do not know the secret password. However, if a password is
forgotten, it can easily deny availability to the intended user. Traditionally this has been
done by using one or more of three authentication techniques; something you have,
something you are, or something you know. Debates about which of these techniques is
the best or which should be used together are ongoing and not the subject of this literature
review. This paper solely focuses on how passwords fall into the last category of
authentication, something you know, and how certain coping mechanisms erode the
security that they provide.

2.2. Entropy: How to Measure Passwords
Entropy in units of bits is the measurement of the strength of a password. A simple
definition of entropy provided by Shay, Komanduri, Kelley, Leon, Marzurek, Bauer,
Cristin, anG &UDQRU   LV WKDW LW LV WKH ³PHDVXUH RI WKH GLIILFXOW\ RI JXHVVLQJ D
SDVVZRUG´ 2ULJLQDOO\ HQWURS\ LQ ,QIRUPDWLRQ 7KHRU\ LQWURGXFHG E\ &ODXGH 6KDQQRQ
(1948) simply measured all possible passwords that could be contained within a key space.
So, a paVVZRUG¶VLQIRUPDWLRQHQWURS\+FDQEHIRXQGE\WKHIROORZLQJIRUPXOD
ܪൌܮ

݈ܰ݃
݈ʹ݃

Where L, Length, is the number of characters in the password, and N is the number
RISRVVLEOHV\PEROVLQHDFKFKDUDFWHU¶VVORW7KHNH\VSDFHFDQEHIRXQGE\VLPSO\WDNLQJ
2 to the power of the entropy of the password to find the total number of possible
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passwords. The post coping entropy measurement used later can be converted the same
way in order to determine the number of attempts needed for a password cracker to find
the password. When using entropy as a measure of password strength in this method it
assumes that all passwords within a key space are equally likely. When dealing with human
generated passwords this assumption is broken completely. In 2004, Burr, Dodson, and
Polk at the National Institute of Standards and Technology 1,67 GHILQHGHQWURS\DV³$
measure of the amount of uncertainty that an attacker faces to determine the value of a
VHFUHW´7KLVSXEOLFDWLRQDOVRNQRZQDV1,676SHFLDO3XEOLFDWLRQ-63 provided a model
WR³FRUUHFW´KXPDQJHQHUDWHGSDVVZRUGVWRDPRUHaccurate entropy (Burr, Dodson, & Polk,
2004).
NIST Special Publication 800-63 of June 2004 suggests the following
scheme to roughly estimate the entropy of human-generated passwords
x

The entropy of the first character is four bits;

x

The entropy of the next seven characters are two bits per character;

x

The ninth through the twentieth character has 1.5 bits of entropy per
character;

x

Characters 21 and above have one bit of entropy per character.

x

A "bonus" of six bits is added if both upper case letters and non-alphabetic
characters are used.

x

A "bonus" of six bits is added for passwords of length 1 through 19
characters following an extensive dictionary check to ensure the password
is not contained within a large dictionary. Passwords of 20 characters or
more do not receive this bonus because it is assumed they are pass-phrases
consisting of multiple dictionary words.

This set of policies put forward by NIST serves as a foundation for most modern
commercial password systems and allows a system administrator an easy metric to design
the password policy for their organization. In order to create policies that will hopefully
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cause strong password creation by users, organizations use this NIST entropy to determine
the strength of a password. Examples, of password policies would be Comprehensive 8,
Blacklist Hard, and Basic 16. (Kelley, et al., 2012) Where the minimum entropy in these
policies are 24 bits, 24 bits and 30 bits respectively. Thus, the greater the entropy, the more
difficult it is for a hacker to predict the value of a variable, and therefore gain access to the
protected information. All of this information is taken into consideration when forming a
password policy.

2.3. Threats to Passwords
There are many types of external threats to a password, social engineering, physical
intrusion, password guessing, and password cracking. Each of these threats to passwords
has a place in risk analysis for security. Threats such as social engineering are handled by
training a workforce in best practices with passwords. Physical intrusion is mitigated by
having a security policy of locking doors or depending on the organization, physical
security. (Sarkar, 2004) Password guessing comes in several different forms, including
brute force attacks where the attacker tries to guess the password by using all possible
combinations of characters, and dictionary attacks where the attacker uses a list of words
to try to guess the password, and the attacker searches for the user¶VSHUVRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQ
such as birthdays and names, to attempt to guess the correct password, and rule based
attacks where an attacker defines a list of rules toward the creation of a wordlist for example
at least 8 letters long contains 1 number, etc... (EC-Council, 2009) Password cracking
attempts to create a string of hashes that has the same encrypted hash as the password. The
password created by the new hash may or may not be the same as the users, but because
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the hash matches, the attacker is granted access. The other method of compromise is when
D KDFNHU FRPSURPLVHV DQ RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V VHUYHU DQG GRZQORDGV WKH XVHUQDPHV DQG
SDVVZRUGV RI DOO XVHUV $OEDQHVLXV   7KLV PD\ EH GHWHFWHG E\ DQ RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
defenses in which case the organization will instruct users to change their passwords. But
DQ DWWDFNHU¶V NQRZOHGJH RI D SUHYLRXV SDVVZRUG FRXOG VWLOO KDYH LPSOLFDWLRQV RQ WKH
passwords through the predictable ways that users cope in creating passwords.
A secure password should be able to withstand these attacks until the next
scheduled password change. Different password cracking algorithms may be used with
varying degrees of effectiveness. Kelley et al. (2012) further expanded on the research by
Komanduri et al. (2011), in utilizing a leaked password list and the data collected in the
Komanduri study (Kelley, et al., 2012; Komanduri, et al., 2011). The analysis reviewed
both the ease at which a password could be cracked and entropy of passwords and allowed
for an infinite number of guesses on each password. It was found that though NIST
considers the password policies known as Basic 16 and Comprehensive 8 equivalent,
Kelley et al. (2012) found that the Basic 16 was the more secure against a large number of
guesses. Basic 16 requires the password to have at least sixteen characters, and
Comprehensive 8 requires a password with at least eight characters, an uppercase, a lower
case, a symbol, and a digit. In addition, Comprehensive 8 could not contain a dictionary
word (Kelley, et al., 2012; Komanduri, et al., 2011). The work done by NIST was an
enormous step forward in providing a quantitative measure for the strength of the password
away from using the same formulas for randomly generated passwords. However, the work
done by Kelly et al. and Komanduri et al. serve to highlight some remaining flaws with
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this system for quantitative analysis of passwords. This paper will serve to further highlight
flaws in the way the NIST model calculates entropy.

2.4. Cognitive Psychology Aspects of Memory: Recall
When H[DPLQLQJPHPRU\WKHTXHVWLRQWKDWLVXVXDOO\DVNHGILUVWLV³+RZPXFKFDQ
VRPHRQH UHPHPEHU"´ 7XUQLQJ WR FRJQLWLYH SV\FKRORJ\ WKH WUDGLWLRQDO DQG PRVW ZLGHO\
DFFHSWHG DQVZHU LV ³6HYHQ 3OXV RU 0LQXV 7ZR´ 7KLV LV ZKDW LV FDOOHG 0LOOHU¶V /DZ
coming from GeRUJH0LOOHU¶V  VHPLQDO SXEOLFDWLRQGHWHUPLQLQJ ³WKDW WKHDYHUDJH
human can hold 7 ± 2 objects in working memory. It is well established within psychology
that this is the limit of human memory. At first glance this is easily applicable to passwords
and many take this statement at face value and most passwords fall in the 8 character range.
In addition, this rule is only applicable to the short term memory instead of long term
PHPRU\ZKHUHSDVVZRUGVVKRXOGEHVWRUHGWREHPHPRUDEOH7KHFRQFHSWRI³6HYen, Plus
or Minus Two is used in psychology for recall tasks where a researcher gives information
to a participant not information that the participant generates themselves. So this will be
applicable to randomly generated passwords generated by a policy and given to a user not
XVHUJHQHUDWHGSDVVZRUGV7KHFRQFHSWRIWKH³6HYHQ3OXVRU0LQXV7ZR´5XOHZLOOQRW
be utilized further due to the fact that all passwords in this study will be generated by
respondents as opposed to randomly generated and that pasVZRUGVZLOOEHSDUWRIXVHU¶V
long term memory rather than their short term memory. However, there are other principles
of cognitive psychology that can be used in order to extend human memory for the purposes
of password generation.
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2.5. Self Generation
Cognitive Psychology does not provide much information in this area as most of
the memory recall studies are performed by the researcher giving a participant information
to recall later rather than the participant producing the information. However, research by
0XOOLJDQ HW DO VKRZ WKDW ³JHQHUDWLRQ HQKDQFHV PHPRU\ IRU WKH RFFXUUHQFH RI LWHPV´
(Muligan, Lozito, & Rosner, 2006). This research showed that memory effects were
enhanced but with a few tradeoffs, which are not relevant to passwords such as text color
and font. Vu, Bhargav, and Proctor eventually applied this directly to passwords using the
QXPEHURIORJLQDWWHPSWVDVDPHDVXUHRIWKHJHQHUDWLRQ,Q9X¶VFDVHWKHPHDQWLPHIRU
log in was 33.7 seconds with 3.77 attempts made before successful login (Vu, Bhargav, &
Proctor, 2003). Vu et al go on to show that patterns involving numbers and special
characters can increase the memorability of passwords but that this comes at the cost of
increased predictability of password structure. This can be shown to indicate the heavy
load that passwords make on human memory and Vu et al. go on to document that there is
a shown tradeoff between security and memorability in most password policies. This heavy
load on memory leads some users to write down their passwords especially in cases where
lockouts are used (Gehringer, 2002). Gehringer goes on to suggest methods to mitigate this
coping mechanism by creating passwords that are anagrams of longer phrases.

2.6. Cueing ± Context Dependency
It has been shown in cognitive psychology, when context is the same while both
learning a subject and testing recall, the human memory will be much more effective and
accurate in recall (Godden & Baddeley, 1975). In addition, by maintaining a consistently
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themed environment at every interaction not just while learning and testing, it is shown
that memory performance is increased (Pessin, 1932). Adding to this, Smith and Vela
VKRZHG WKDW VLPSO\ YLVLWLQJ ³DQ HQYLURQPHQWDO FRQWH[W DFWV DV D FXH IRU SDVW PHPRULHV
related to that particuODUHQYLURQPHQWDOFRQWH[W´ 6PLWK 9HOD ,QWKHFRQWH[WRI
passwords this means that the user interface should be kept, specifically the log in,
FRQVLVWHQWWKURXJKRXWWKHVWXG\DVWKLVZLOODIIHFWRXUSDUWLFLSDQW¶VDELOLW\WRUHPHPEHUWKHLU
passwords. It should be noted that this context dependency will in no way affect the security
of a current password only the ability to remember it in the future. This will also mean that
the user can bring in habits from other experiences with similarly themed designs. In order
to not incur any additional coping a unique interface for our website was created from
scratch. This should help to prevent any cueing from commonly used open source
interfaces. To limit the loss of memorability of the password, the interface of the website
will not be changed throughout the duration of the study so as to help cue the user of their
password.
The implications of drawing from cognitive psychology literature for this study is
that there will be a deeper understanding of why each password was made in comparison
to most studies of passwords, which tend to use an overarching analysis strategy such as
Markov chains in which some information, like longer patterns, may be lost (Yiannis,
2013). At the same time, much of the cognitive psychology literature can be misused as
well due to the fact that many of the recall and cueing tasks researched in the cognitive
psychology realm are based on information that is generated by researchers and given to
participants rather than generated by participants themselves. This makes it more difficult
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to draw on each field without first considering how and by whom the information in the
subsequent research was generated.

2.7. Chunking
Chunking is the concept in cognitive psychology that refers to tKHKXPDQPLQG¶VDELOLW\WR
better organize, store, and recall information better by storing it as several pieces rather
than a whole string of information. Using the concept of chunking allows what appears as
individual characters within passwords or a whole string to become meaningful words
stored in the human mind as one concept rather than by their individual characters (Miller,
1956). By gathering characters together into meaningful groupings (i.e. chunks) the tax on
memory can be kept the same or reduced whilst increasing the key space and entropy of
the password. By considering the user of a password policy has certain known strengths
and weaknesses in memory retrieval and then catering to these strong traits and minimizing
policy reliance on weaknesses in human memory, password entropy can be greatly
increased without increasing the strain on user memory.
This can be shown in the structure of passwords; for example when passwords are required
to contain numbers, it is shown that a significant portion of people will place a set of
numbers and/or symbols at the end of the password (Komanduri, et al., 2011). While this
reduces the tax on human memory that the password takes, some of the strategies people
use to cope using chunking can be exploited by passZRUGFUDFNHUV¶VXEVWULQJIXQFWLRQV
(John the Ripper Wordlist Rules Syntax, 2015)
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2.8. Proactive - Interference
The concept of proactive interference states that similar past events will interfere
in the recall of future similar events (Keppel & Underwood, 1962).While originally applied
to short term memory it was eventually applied to long term memory (Postman & Keppel,
1977). In an everyday example of this principle, many have experienced a moment of
forgetfulness where they have parked a car in one specific spot or area and one day are
forced to park else where one day. Then without thinking a person may go back to the
location to which they are accustomed. Applied to passwords, this concept is the
psychological framework that explains how a user will have a hard time remembering a
password for a short time after changing their password. It provides the framework that
states that multiple tests of this information will help the subject overcome these effects
(Nunes & Weinstein, 2012).This psychological principal can also go to show that people
ZLOOFRQWLQXHWRZDQWWRUHPDLQVHWLQWKHLUZD\V7KLV³%HFDXVH,¶YHDOZD\VGRQHLWWKLV
ZD\´SULQFLSOHKHOSVWRH[SODLQDGGLWLRQDOUHDVRQVZK\DQGKRZDSHUVRQZRXOGFRSHE\
maintaining similar content and/or structure in their passwords as a coping mechanism.

2.9. Psychological Coping Mechanisms
There have been a variety of patterns that have become apparent that a significant
portion of people use on a daily basis with their passwords. These common coping
mechanisms can be documented by information security specialists to help encourage
future password creation to occur without these influences and by password crackers to
take advantage of these coping mechanisms to break the security of passwords at increased
speed. Florencio and Herley analyzed the password habits of 544,960 individuals over a
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three-month period. They found that the average user has 6.5 passwords shared across 3.9
different websites. In addition, each user has an average of twenty-five accounts that
require passwords, and on average types eight passwords per day. Florencio and Herley
estimate that at least 1.5% of users forgot their password every month (Florencio & Herley,
2007). This study is notable for showing that users regularly cope by using the same
password across multiple sites and have problems remembering their passwords.
2QH VWXG\ WKDW VHHPV WR QHJDWH PDQ\ RI WKH FRQFHUQV RI XVHUV¶ ZULWLQJ GRZQ
passwords was completed by Shay et al. (2010). This study had 470 participants who were
requLUHG WR FKDQJH WKHLU XQLYHUVLW\¶V SDVVZRUG GXH WR D V\VWHP ZLGH FKDQJH LQ SROLF\
While a much smaller percentage of individuals, in this case 13%, wrote down their
password, a much larger percent, 80%, reused a password, and 50% reported modifying an
old password to create a new one. Each of these are considered coping mechanisms laid
out within this study that participants can do in an attempt to comply with password policy
requirements(Shay, et al., 2010).
Memory is a finite resource and it has been shown that people cope in a particular
way in order to reduce the load that passwords place on memory (Vu, Bhargav, & Proctor,
2003). The cognitive load placed on memory is a heavy burden as the number of passwords
scale up and accounts are used less frequently. The precedent exists that when people are
SODFHGLQVLWXDWLRQVWKDWUHTXLUHDKLJKFRJQLWLYHORDGWKH\ZLOO³DGDSWWRWKHDLGVDYDLODEOH
WRWKHPVRDVWRPDLQWDLQORZRYHUDOOOHYHOVRIHIIRUWH[SHQGLWXUH´ 7RGG %HQEasat, 1994).
Thus, coping mechanisms can be framed as an attempt to provide leverage on that burden.
These coping mechanisms include variations of passwords that remain upon
password changes. The definition that will be used in this paper is any mechanism that
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brings information form one password to another across password changes will be called a
coping mechanism. Examples of this can include utilizing the same password across
multiple accounts, doubling the password, slightly modifying the password by
incrementing the number or special character, or even forgetting the password, requiring a
reset, which often takes time and decreases productivity (Komanduri, et al., 2011).

2.10. Perspectives on Password Cracking
Many of the means used to think about and analyze passwords come from
cryptography. In this way the password can be viewed as a key is in cryptography
(excluding the one time pad). The similarities being that a finite amount of time is required
to figure out the key as well as a password and a string of characters are needed in order to
gain access to information. Unlike some early cryptographic algorithms, information
cannot be gained from attempting to try incorrect passwords as in something like a
Vigenère cipher.

In both cases, a relatively calculable finite lifetime exists where

passwords and cryptographic keys provide security to whatever they are protecting. Unlike
keys used in cryptography where best practice suggests using completely random
information for the key, passwords normally do not ask this of users. This means that the
passwords will not be as uncertain as random data. NIST has documented the lowering of
uncertainty this causes in their model for entropy. The model NIST set forward does not
go on to model any additional drops in entropy accounted for by knowing a usHU¶VSUHYLRXV
password or passwords. While this model makes sense it assumes that passwords will be
kept secret and not broken in the time given before a scheduled password change. This
assumption has been broken rather publicly many times in recent years with account
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information being leaked to the web with Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn all publicly
confirming user information has been breached and publicly posted (Burnett,
2015);(Kleinman, 2014);(Silveira, 2012). The traditional response in all cases to breaches
such as these has been to instruct or force affected users to immediately change their
passwords. The sense is that the affected accounts are now secure because the passwords
are now different than the ones that were leaked. That is unfortunately not the case as said
before passwords created by humans are not randomly created and humans draw from our
own experiences in order to create passwords. The same psychological principles discussed
earlier go into the creation of passwords in most often the same way to create similar new
passwords. So that knowing a previous password means that it will probably be easier to
break a new password from the same person.
This is made easier by freely available software that allows anyone to attack
passwords (Metasploit, 2015; John the Ripper, 2015; THC-Hydra, 2014; Hashcat, 2015).
These software packages allow passwords on a variety of systems to be attacked via brute
force, dictionary, and rule based attacks. This allows for rule based attacks to be performed
targeting commonly identified coping mechanisms in passwords, incrementing, doubling,
HWF« ,Q DGGLWLRQ RWKHU WHFKQLTXHV H[LVW WR WDUJHW FRSLQJ PHFKDQLVP E\ JHQHUDWLQJ
passwords similar to input. Techniques such as Markov chain modelling and mangling
passwords via probabilistic context-free grammars can also be used to break password
JLYHQLQSXWIURP³WUDLQLQJVHWV´ 'HOO $PLFR0LFKLDUGL <YHV 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

This chapter consists of the methodology, variables, study environment, samples,
instruments, biases, approvals, data collection, and analysis.
The study started with 1030 participants and dropped down at each iteration to a
final of approximately 30 participants per policy for a total of 92 participants remaining
throughout the whole study. Much of this loss is attributed to a respondents being paid
less for iterations 2 through 7 than for iteration 1. This was determined to not affect the
representativeness of the study by comparing the passwords of the respondents who
completed all 7 iterations by policy of the study to all respondents who completed each
individual iteration by policy.
3.1. Methodology and Variables
This is an experimental research study designed to gather 7 password iterations
from 1030 individuals recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk for a total of 2434
passwords. These 2434 passwords were studied to classify the coping mechanisms used.
Then the coping mechanisms were analyzed using the NIST measure of entropy to
determine the extent to which that particular coping mechanism affects the true entropy.
Finally, the coping mechanisms themselves were analyzed to determine if there are patterns
in types of coping mechanisms used or patterns across the population.
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3.2. Procedure
This password study tracked a participantV¶ SDVVZRUGV DFURVV  LWHUDWLRQV RI
participation with a password changing once a week. Participants were recruited through
Amazon Mechanical Turk. After each iteration was completed participants were invited
back through an internal email service provided by Amazon so that no personally
identifiable information was exchanged including email addresses. Amazon Mechanical
Turk workers not already participating in the study through iteration 1 were prevented from
entering the study in any of the following iterations through the use of the Amazon
Mechanical Turk qualifications mechanism. The qualification mechanisms also allowed
IRUPRUHHIILFLHQWWUDFNLQJRIDSDUWLFLSDQW¶VVWDWXVZLWKLQWKHVWXG\ Each invitation that
was sent to participants included a link to the Amazon Mechanical Turk Human Interaction
Task (HIT) which would provide a link to the study. Using Amazon Mechanical Turk as a
proxy between participants and the researcher developed website allowed for efficient
payment of participants.
When participants first entered the website they were asked to register with the
website. At this point participants were randomly assigned in to one of the three password
policies. The participants were asked to enter their Mechanical Turk ID as a username,
select a SDVVZRUGDQGDµIRUJHW\RXUSDVVZRUG¶TXHVWLRQDQGDQVZHUDWWKLVSRLQWAt each
login participants entered the study to do a survey which related to information security.
The first iteration the study simply asked for demographic information followed by the
next five iterations asking basic understanding of information security. The seventh
iteration consisted of questions relating to how passwords were chosen for this study and
password practices across accounts. For iterations two through seven, participants were
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asked to change their password after logging in to the website through a change your
password option. Participants were prevented from filling out the survey until they had
performed a password change. The specific questions that participants were asked are
located in Appendix A of this thesis. The passwords were analyzed for a variety of security
related metrics explained in section 3.3 of this thesis.

3.3. Description of Variables
The variables being studied include: 1) prevalence of coping mechanisms, 2)
entropy, the measure of randomness and surprise within information theory. Entropy was
measured under two sets of criteria: 1) the NIST model of entropy as laid out in the NIST
Special Publication 800-63 and 2) the model put forth by this research designed to take
into consideration the sequential dependency of coping over time. From this model, the
coping mechanisms themselves were examined for their prevalence within the password
policies.

3.3.1 Types of Coping Mechanisms
Coping mechanisms have been categorized into three categories 1) using known
information, 2) partial repetition, and 3) easily identifiable patterns. In the using known
information category, the coping mechanisms that are expected to be seen are usernames
being used as passwords and passwords being reused in entirety. The categories of partial
repetition contain coping mechanisms such and simply repeating information across time.
The last category of easily identifiable patterns will contain easily recognizable
patterns such as incrementing and using only one character in the entire password,
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changing the case of a letter within the password, and common keyboard patterns for
SDVVZRUGVVXFKDVµTZHUW\¶$EUHDNGRZQRIWKHHQWURS\DVVLJQPHQWLVDVIROORZVIRUWKHVH
coping mechanism is as follows.
For Using Known Information
Iteration 1
P a s s w o r d
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Iteration 2
P a
1

s

s w o

r

d

In this example I have shown how entire reuse of a password is assigned an value of 1 bit
of entropy. The reasoning behind this will be explained in section 3.1.1.2
For Partial Repetition:
Iteration 1:
P a s s w o r d a
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.5

Iteration 2:
P a
4

s

s w o

r

d x
2

In this example what is seen is the data that has stayed the same over time is assigned the
value of entropy for one character under the NIST Policy and any new information is
HYDOXDWHG DV LW QRUPDOO\ ZRXOG XQGHU WKH 1,67 SROLF\ ,Q WKLV ZD\ WKH ILUVW LWHUDWLRQ¶V
H[DPSOHSDVVZRUGZRXOGKDYHELWVRIHQWURS\DQGWKHVHFRQGLWHUDWLRQ¶VSDVVword
ZKLFKLVGHSHQGHQWRQWKHILUVWLWHUDWLRQ¶VLQIRUPDWLRQZRXOGKDYHELWVRIHQWURS\
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For Easily Identifiable Patterns
Iteration 1:
P a s s w o r d 1
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.5
Iteration 2:
R a n d o
4 2 2 2 2
Iteration 3:
x x
4 2

x x x
2 2 2

m P W 2
2 2 2

x
2

x x 3
2 2

In this example what is seen is incrementing over time the numbers being incremented are
not assigned any value of entropy in the coping model and any new information is
evaluated as it normally would under the NIST policy. Each of these categories will be
analyzed for their prevalence amongst the policy.

3.3.2 Entropy Measures
In the using known information coping mechanism of using a username as a
password as well as reusing old passwords these passwords will be evaluated as 1 bit of
entropy. The reasoning behind this is that most password crackers have the option to use
the login information (username) as the first attempt for a brute force check of the
SDVVZRUG 7KLV LV VKRZQ LQ WKH IROORZLQJ ILJXUH ZKHUH WKH RSWLRQ WR ³7U\ ORJLn as
SDVVZRUG´LVOLVWHGZLWKDFKHFNER[ (THC Hydra Password Cracker, 2015)
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Figure 1: THC Hydra Interface

Symantec published a study on zero day exploits indicating that for the average
organization that is compromised it takes approximately 10 months before the intrusion is
detected (Bilge & Dumitras, 2012). Most organizations have passwords expire after a set
length of time usually on the scale of a few months (Scarfone & Souppaya, 2009). This
means that most users have already had at least one password change since the organization
was compromised or if the said organization has discovered the compromise and has
implemented a mandatory password change. In most cases, the check performed on the
creation of the new password will only check to make sure the password is different from
the current password and conforms to the policy. If the malicious actor had compromised
the passwords of the organization then it is customary for the passwords to be placed into
D GLFWLRQDU\ ZRUG OLVW WR EH XVHG WR FUDFN XVHU¶V SDVVZRUGV LQ ZKLFK FDVH WKH SUHYLRXV
passwords have become known quantities and are no longer secret. If the user then reverts
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EDFNWRSUHYLRXVSDVVZRUGLWZRXOGEHWULYLDOWRFUDFNWKHXVHU¶VDFcount in this case and
the reuse of the password should be treated as providing no security with 1 bit of entropy.
The rest of the policy for assigning entropy values will rely heavily on the NIST model for
entropy laid forth in the special publication 800-63. This way any new data within the
password or data that cannot yet be attributed to using known information, partial
repetition, or easily identifiable patterns will simply be treated as it would have in the
standard NIST implementation of password entropy.
One of the common coping mechanisms within password creation is incrementing.
This is done by changing one letter or number usually on the end of a password to the next
letter or number in the alphanumeric sequence. The example of this would be Password 1:
xxxxxxx1 to Password 2: xxxxxxx2, to Password 3: xxxxxxx3, etc.
In the case of incrementing the user will use a predictable and recognizable pattern
in order to lower the load that the password places on his or her memory. Using this case
above in conjunction with the NIST Model of Entropy there is one character change
between password 1 and password 2, the first seven characters will be treated as a singular
block and provide it with what NIST proscribes for the first character in a password 4 bits
of entropy. Since the number, the 8th character, in this case is new information it will also
be treated as a new character under the NIST model. This means it will be treated as the
second character in the NIST policy providing it 2 bits of entropy. Since the next character
is still new for password two and it is a number it will still receive the 6 bit special character
modifier at this second password. However, if an attacker now knows password 1 and
password 2 it is likely that they will have noticed an incrementing from one to two to three
this will now be a predictable pattern that can be incredibly easily exploited by password
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crackers. This is exploited by the password cracker by treating the alphabetic characters
that stay the same in the password as a substring allowing the remaining characters to be
randomly brute forced (John the Ripper Wordlist Rules Syntax, 2015) (Rule-based Attack,
2015). So, in the third iteration two separate losses in entropy will be seen. The first is that
entropy will no longer be given for the 8th character because the coping mechanism of
incrementing has been observed. The second loss of entropy will be from the 6 bit bonus
given for using non alphabetic characters, a number. This third iteration the number that
KDVEHHQLQFUHPHQWHGZLOOEHWUHDWHGDVD³QXPHULFYDULDEOH´DQGWKHHQWURS\JDLQHGE\
increasing the key space by adding in numbers to the password is now lost due to the
knowledge that only numbers will be used in this character space. This is done because on
the password cracking side by specifying that character as a numeric variable (John the
Ripper Wordlist Rules Syntax, 2015; Rule-based Attack, 2015). This same loss of entropy
for the using only numbers can be seen in other passwords. For example, if a user only uses
numbers in their password and it can be predicted that they continue to do so. The entropy
bonus for using numbers or special characters will be eliminated from the calculation of
the entropy.
3.4. Demographics
As part of the study surveys were WDNHQ IRU UHVSRQGHQW¶V GHPRJUDSKLFV The
demographics that were collected are a respondent¶VDJHJHQGHUUDFHOHYHORIHGXFDWLRQ
income, marital status, and field of employment. This information will not be correlated to
password strength as predictors for the entropy strength or for the prevalence of coping
mechanics as this is outside the scope of the research questions, but it is made available for

27
other researchers who do want to make these steps and to show the representativeness of
the sample.

3.5. Sample
The original sample of participants used in this study is 1030 participants that were
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk web services. However, many participants are
expected to drop out over the course of seven iterations of the study. As for the purposes
of this study as common for most applications if approximately 30 participants remain in
the study per policy until iteration 7 then the sample will still remain valid (Morse, 2000).
Having approximately 30 participants in each sample groups conforms to much of the
literature on sample sizes in studies of memory effects in regards to passwords. (Vu,
Bhargav, & Proctor, 2003) (Vu, et al., 2006) (Muligan, Lozito, & Rosner, 2006) (Nunes &
Weinstein, 2012)

3.6. Bias
As this study relates to information security due to Institutional Review Board
policies as well as Amazon Mechanical Turk policies, it was decided that it would be best
to not form the data collection as a deception study. This means that there may be
observation bias associated with the fact that the research participants know that they are
involved in a research study focused on information security and may act differently in
order to impress or satisfy researchers by creating stronger passwords than they would have
otherwise. If significant results are observed of coping mechanism eroding the security of
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a policy then it can be argued that in a normal environment where users are not being
actively observed these coping mechanisms will be even stronger.

3.7. Approval
Institutional Review Board Approval was received for Protocol#1410015359 on
November 11th, 2014. With approval for an amendment received on December 8th, 2014.
The full application is attached in the section labeled Appendix B.

3.8. Data Collection and Analysis
Data analysis was broken down into four categories; within policy by iteration,
within policy across iterations, across policy by iterations, and across policy across
iterations. Research questions 1 and 2 were answered by the analysis of the coping
mechanisms. The prevalence of coping mechanisms is shown within each policy by
iteration and across policies (prevalence of coping mechanisms is determined by dividing
the number of passwords that use coping mechanisms by the number of passwords in the
policy). The prevalence of coping mechanisms was analyzed individually to show which
policy are most susceptible to each coping mechanism. Entropy is given both under the
NIST models as well as Post Coping Models along with Standard Deviations (SD). These
entropy values were measured for significance using one sample t-testing against the
minimum entropy levels allowed by the policy. This was used to determine the answer to
research question 3 if the entropy fall below the minimum levels allowable by the policy
and when policy the entropy levels fall significantly below the level of minimum entropy
by the password policy the password policy is considered broken.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The thesis investigated the following research questions: What is the prevalence
and extent of the coping mechanisms (using known information, partial repetition, and
easily identifiable patterns) to which users engage by policy and across iterations? Do user
coping mechanisms decrease the strength of password policies to such a degree that the
increase of security sought by the stringent policy is negated?

4.1. Overview
The average entropy of all the passwords across the study is 32.51129 bits. Splitting
the three policies apart and averaging across iterations with all 1030 respondents it is shown
that according to the NIST measurements of entropy Basic 16 is the strongest policy
followed by Blacklist Hard, and Comprehensive 8.
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4.2. Policy Analysis
The study went on for 7 iterations first starting with approximately 1030
participants falling to 91 by the end. As shown in the model for NIST Entropy below the
passwords created throughout the study show a relatively consistent strength growing over
time.
Table 1: Significance in NIST Model by Policy by Iteration
Using NIST 800-63
Model

Password Iteration 1
Password Iteration 2
Password Iteration 3
Password Iteration 4
Password Iteration 5
Password Iteration 6
Password Iteration 7

Comprehensive 8
Blacklist Hard
Basic 16
Entro ST
ST
ST
py
D
N
N
Entropy D
N
Entropy D
335
27.8 3.5 343
31.3 4.6 350
37.0
4.4
164
27.7 3.3 171
32.0 4.4 161
37.8
5.0
107
28.1 3.6 107
32.2 4.1
98
38.2
5.1
85
28.2 4.1
87
32.1 4.3
78
38.4
5.0
47
28.5 4.0
49
33.2 5.1
44
38.9
5.1
38
28.4 4.0
44
33.0 4.1
34
39.6
6.6
30
29.2 5.0
30
32.8 4.9
32
38.3
4.4

The minimum entropy of the policies are 24, 24, and 30 bits for the Comprehensive
8, Blacklist Hard, and Basic 16 policies respectively. Statistical significance above the
minimum entropy levels with p < 0.05 is shown in green.
Under the NIST policy all three of the policies examined show that their entropy is
significantly above the minimum requirements for the policy. This means that from the
perspective of the administrator, the organization they are trying to protect is secured above
and beyond that required by the minimum requirements dictated by policy.
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Table 2: Average Length of passwords
Lengths
Comprehensive 8 Blacklist Hard Basic 16
Iteration 1
10.56
9.91
18.32
Iteration 2
10.45
10.04
18.70
Iteration 3
10.72
10.23
19.14
Iteration 4
10.82
10.21
18.91
Iteration 5
11.00
11.47
18.89
Iteration 6
10.92
10.77
19.85
Iteration 7
11.47
11.13
18.66
The thought that respondents went above and beyond the minimum requirements
placed upon them by the policy is confirmed once again when looking at the lengths of the
passwords that respondents created. The minimum lengths of passwords required by the
policies were 8, 8, and 16 characters for the Comprehensive 8, Blacklist Hard, and Basic
16 policies. In every iteration in every policy the average length was at least one whole
character above the minimum requirement for length.
This security is called into question once the coping mechanisms are taken into
consideration and the passwords are examined over time. Using the methodology laid forth
above coping mechanisms were examined and overtime showed to erode the security of
the policy to levels significantly below the minimum standards set forth by the policy. Post
coping entropy (PCE) measurements for each policy that are significantly above the
minimum values for the policy with p < 0.05 are listed in green while Post coping entropy
(PCE) measurements for each policy that are significantly below the minimum values for
entropy with p < 0.05 are listed in red.
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Table 3: Significance in Post Coping Model by Policy by Iteration
Post Coping
Analysis
N
Password Iteration
1
Password Iteration
2
Password Iteration
3
Password Iteration
4
Password Iteration
5
Password Iteration
6
Password Iteration
7

Comprehensive 8
PCE
STD

N

Blacklist Hard
PCE
STD

Basic 16
PCE
STD

N

335

27.6

3.7

343

29.1

8.1

350

35.1

6.4

164

18.8

10.7

171

24.5

12.2

161

28.9

13.5

107

14.3

12.0

107

16.8

14.9

98

22.1

16.8

85

15.0

13.7

87

17.1

14.7

78

24.2

16.6

47

14.4

13.3

49

16.6

16.0

44

24.2

16.7

38

15.1

13.3

44

17.9

15.9

34

18.2

18.7

30

17.2

13.8

30

21.7

15.0

32

19.5

18.0

A major difference between the policies is the rate at which entropy is lost. The
Comprehensive 8 policy falls below its minimum level of entropy of 24 bits with a value
of 18.8 bits at its second iteration. This means that after only one iteration passwords have
become public the policy is harmed by the coping mechanisms that users exhibit.
The Blacklist Hard policy falls below its minimum level of entropy of 24 bits with a value
of 16.8 bits at its third iteration. The Basic 16 policy falls below its minimum level of
entropy of 30 bits with a value of 22.1 bits at its third iteration. The average level of entropy
IRUWKH%DVLF¶VSRVWFRSLQJHQWURS\ZDVDWLWVVHFRQGLWHUDWLRQZKLFKZDVEHORZ
the minimum level of 30 bits. However, this did not meet the necessary levels of
significance at alpha = 0.05, meaning at this point the post coping entropy was not
significantly different that the minimum levels of entropy provided by the policy. In other
words the policy was still secure.
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This drop in entropy across iterations invalidates the security of the policy with
only one disclosure of passwords for Comprehensive 8 and two disclosures of passwords
in the Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policies. This would mean that from the policy
perspective, passwords of the Comprehensive 8 policy are not protecting users as well as
the Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policies.
4.3. Sample Representativeness

P-values
Iteration 1
Iteration 2
Iteration 3
Iteration 4
Iteration 5
Iteration 6
Iteration 7

Table 4: Sample Representativeness 2 sample t-testing
Comprehensive 8
Blacklist Hard
Basic 16
0.1042
0.8219
0.9979
0.5480
0.4431
0.3975
0.8293
0.4186
0.8607
0.3444
0.6607
0.3125
1
1

0.0734
0.1723
0.2874
0.2319
0.7025
0.9068
1

It could be argued that using the respondents that have not completed every iteration
of the study biases results. In order to assuage these concerns, two sample t-tests were
performed against respondents who completed all seven iterations against each and all
respondents in the respective iteration by policy. Results show no significant difference at
alpha = 0.05 between the respondents who completed all seven iterations of the study and
those that did not.
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4.4. Comparing Policies
Table 5: Post Coping Analysis by Policy by Iteration
Post Coping Analysis Comprehensive 8
Blacklist Hard
Basic 16
N
PCE STD N
PCE STD N
PCE STD
Password Iteration 1
335 27.6
3.7
343 29.1
8.1 350 35.1
6.4
Password Iteration 2
164 18.8 10.7
171 24.5 12.2 161 28.9 13.5
Password Iteration 3
107 14.3 12.0
107 16.8 14.9 98 22.1 16.8
Password Iteration 4
85 15.0 13.7
87 17.1 14.7 78 24.2 16.6
Password Iteration 5
47 14.4 13.3
49 16.6 16.0 44 24.2 16.7
Password Iteration 6
38 15.1 13.3
44 17.9 15.9 34 18.2 18.7
Password Iteration 7
30 17.2 13.8
30 21.7 15.0 32 19.5 18.0

The Basic 16 policy was a stronger policy from the start of the study with 30 bits
of entropy and remains stronger than the Blacklist Hard policy or the Comprehensive 8 at
iteration 3, after all three policies strengths have fallen below their minimum allowable
values. This is measured by showing a statistically significant difference in two sample ttesting with the post coping entropy measures at alpha = 0.05 with p value of 0.0157.
Although the mean of the Blacklist Hard policy is higher than the Comprehensive
8 policy at each iteration in the study by iteration 3 the post coping entropy values are no
longer significantly different from each other at alpha = 0.05 with p value of 0.1929. In
other words, in terms of protection it cannot be determined which policy (Comprehensive
8 or Blacklist Hard) provides more protection for its users at iteration 3.
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4.5. Prevalence and Extent
Table 6: Quantity of Coping Mechanisms by Policy by Iteration
Identifiable
Number of
Number of
Number of
Coping
Participants who
Participants who
Participants who
Mechanism
Coped In
Coped in Blacklist Coped in Basic
Prevalence
Comprehensive 8
Hard
16
Iteration 1
3
21
22
Iteration 2
82
50
46
Iteration 3
73
57
48
Iteration 4
51
47
34
Iteration 5
31
29
21
Iteration 6
23
22
20
Iteration 7
18
13
17

As iterations go on, more and more data can be compared to each of the previous
passwords and more coping mechanisms can be identified. Two of the coping
mechanisms in this study, partial repetition and easily identifiable patterns can only
be identified with successive password iterations. So as passwords are subjected to
more and more scrutiny as time goes on in this model as coping mechanisms
become easier and easier to identify the more data becomes available to an attacker.
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Percentage

Prevalence of Coping Mechanisms
100.00%
90.00%
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%

Iterati
on 1

Iterati
on 2

Iterati
on 3

Iterati
on 4

Iterati
on 5

Iterati
on 6

Iterati
on 7

Comprehensive 8 0.90%

50.00% 68.22% 60.00% 65.96% 60.53% 60.00%

Blacklist Hard

6.12%

29.24% 53.27% 54.02% 59.18% 50.00% 43.33%

Basic 16

6.29%

28.57% 48.98% 43.59% 47.73% 58.82% 53.13%

Comprehensive 8

Blacklist Hard

Basic 16

Figure 4: Prevalence of Coping Mechanisms
,QWHUPVRITXDQWLW\DWLWHUDWLRQWKHSUHYDOHQFHRIUHVSRQGHQWV¶FRSLQJLVKLJKHU
in the Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 with 21 and 22 respondents coping than in the
Comprehensive 8 policy with only 3 respondents coping. The Comprehensive 8 policy
shows a much greater prevalence of coping mechanisms in every iteration after iteration 1
than either the Blacklist Hard or the Basic 16 policies.
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Comprehensive 8
60.00%
50.00%

Percentage

40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%

Iteratio
n1

Iteratio
n2

Iteratio
n3

Iteratio
n4

Iteratio
n5

Iteratio
n6

Iteratio
n7

Using Known Information

1.19%

12.20%

25.23%

21.18%

19.15%

10.53%

13.33%

Partial Repition

0.00%

34.15%

45.79%

35.29%

42.55%

50.00%

43.33%

Easily Identifable Patterns

0.00%

33.54%

44.86%

36.47%

40.43%

36.84%

33.33%

Using Known Information

Partial Repition

Easily Identifable Patterns

Figure 5: Extent of Coping Mechanisms in Comprehensive 8

Blacklist Hard
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0.00%

Iteratio
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Iteratio
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Using Known Information

6.12%

13.45%

33.64%

33.33%

48.98%

38.64%

30.00%

Partial Repition

0.00%
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Figure 6: Extent of Coping Mechanisms in Blacklist Hard
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Figure 7: Extent of Coping Mechanisms in Basic 16

As shown in the above figures the policies examined have different susceptibility
to different kinds of coping mechanisms. The Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policies are
shown to be much more susceptible to using known information in the first iteration than
the Comprehensive 8 policy. At the first iteration 6.12% of Blacklist Hard respondents
used the coping mechanism of using known information, 6.29 % of Basic 16 respondents
used known information and 1.19% of respondents for the Comprehensive 8 policy used
known information. This trend fades away after the first iteration with the percentage of
respondents using known information rising to 12.20%, 13.45%, and 11.80% in the second
iteration for the Comprehensive 8, Blacklist Hard, and Basic 16 policies respectively.
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Respondents in the Comprehensive 8 policy are much more likely to use partial
repetition and easily identifiable patterns when compared to the Blacklist Hard and Basic
16 policies. For the coping mechanism of partial repetition at iteration 2, 34.15% of
respondents in the Comprehensive 8 policy compared to 21.74% of users in Basic 16 and
14.62% of respondents in Blacklist Hard. For the coping mechanism of easily identifiable
patterns at iteration 2, 33.54% of respondents in the Comprehensive 8 policy compared to
8.19% of users in Blacklist Hard and 4.35% of respondents in Blacklist Hard.
As each successive password became known it became easier and easier to guess
WKHFRQWHQWRIWKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VSDVVZRUGVDVXVHUVcontinue to maintain similar information
across password changes. When taken into comparison with the previous NIST model it is
discovered that entropy is increasingly lost as time goes on instead of gained. It is
discovered that this loss in entropy seen at the policy level is eroding the security to the
point of ineffectiveness after the first disclosure of passwords in the Comprehensive 8
policy and the second disclosure in the Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policies. It is due to
the qualities of the policies namely the more stringent requirements placed on users in the
Comprehensive 8 policy that users cope more heavily. At the same time, the qualities of
the Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policy encourage respondents to cope less except in the
category of using known information.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

5.1. Research Question 1
What is the prevalence of the coping mechanisms to which respondents engage by policy
and across iterations?
By iteration two, 50.00% of respondents were coping in the Comprehensive 8,
compared to 29.24% of respondents in the Blacklist Hard policy and 28.57% of
respondents in the Basic 16 policy. By iteration 3 the prevalence rises to 68.22% of
respondents coping in the Comprehensive 8 policy compared to 53.27% of respondents in
the Blacklist Hard policy and 48.98% of respondents in the Basic 16 policy. Coping
mechanisms are most prevalent in the Comprehensive 8 policy followed by the Blacklist
Hard policy and finally the Basic 16 policy. This directly corresponds to the amount of
requirements in the policies placed onto the respondents. In the Comprehensive 8 policy
there were 4 requirements placed on respondents. (At least: 8 characters, 1 capital letter, 1
lowercase letter, and 1 special character) this wide variety of requirements is compared to
the 2 requirements placed on users in the Blacklist Hard policy (At least 8 characters and
no words in the dictionary blacklist) and only one requirement in the Basic 16 policy. This
indicates that the prevalence of coping mechanisms is positively correlated with the
number of requirements placed on the user by the password policy.
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If coping mechanisms are treated as a function of the cognitive load that each
requirement places on users then it would be best practice from a security perspective to
create or choose policies with a limited number of requirements. Based on the results of
this study it should be suggested that if a requirement is to be placed on a user through
the password policy that the requirement should be minimum length as increasing the
minimum length of the password did not serve to increase the prevalence of coping
mechanisms. This may be because passwords that are longer can consist of multiple
ZRUGVWKDWZLOOEHVWRUHGPRUHHIILFLHQWO\LQWKHXVHU¶VPLQGDVDFRQFHSWWKURXJKWKH
process of chunking thus reducing the cognitive load on memory compared to a similar
length password consisting of random information. This memory strategy provides more
support towards using longer passwords with less policy requirements.

5.2. Research Question 2
To what extent do respondents engage in the following coping mechanisms?
The participants in the Comprehensive 8 policy engaged in coping mechanisms
most frequently and most heavily by using by partial repetition and easily identifiable
patterns. The features of this policy namely the special characters and numbers serve as the
most frequent means of coping. That is the special requirements placed on users by the
Comprehensive 8 policy serve as a means only to make passwords more predictable rather
than increasing the entropy of the password. The Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policies show
the higher coping only in the category of using known information in a few of the iterations.
These coping mechanisms of using known information can be easily stopped at
password changes by securely storing past passwords in an encrypted database and using
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them as a blacklist against reuse for future passwords. Another check to ensure that the
XVHU¶V XVHUQDPH LV QRW XVHG DV WKH SDVVZRUG VKRXOG DOVR EH SHUIRUPHG XSRQ SDVVZRUG
change. Implementing these two steps could stop the coping mechanisms identified as
using known information without noticeable increase in wait time from the perspective of
the user at the password change. It could be argued that by preventing users from coping
in this manner would cause them to move toward other coping methods but they will not
be as easy to identify from the attackers perspective and would require further research to
identify this movement. Additionally, if coping serves to reduce the cognitive load that
passwords place on human memory then by banning some coping mechanisms it could be
argued that this would reduce the memorability of passwords. This should be investigated
in further research as to the extent of this possibility. However, as discussed before this
could be mitigated in longer passwords consisting of multiple words if they exhibit the
psychological principle of chunking.

5.3. Research Question 3
Do user coping mechanisms decrease the strength of password policies to such a degree
that the increase of security sought by the stringent policy is negated?
Coping mechanisms do serve to erode password security to the point that the
password will not serve as an effective security measure in all policies. The difference
between policies is at which iteration this happens. After only one iteration of passwords
is disclosed the Comprehensive 8 policy can no longer be expected to provide a minimum
standard of security of 24 bits of entropy.
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This has wide implications for organizations that have experienced password
leakages as the common practice in response to this disclosure is an immediate password
change. This research indicates that this response will not be enough to provide the
H[SHFWHGPLQLPXPVWDQGDUGRIVHFXULW\DIWHUXVHU¶VSDVVZRUGVKDYHEHFRPHNQRZQRQFH
The Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policy required 2 disclosures of the passwords before the
policy itself fell below its minimum standards of entropy. Meaning from the organizational
perspective the policy can still provide adequate protection after one disclosure of
passwords and one iteration of changes. However, after two iterations of password
disclosure the Blacklist Hard and Basic 16 policies can no longer provide the minimum
standard of security. Taking this overview of the policies examined in the study it should
be stated that the Basic 16 policy is the most secure policy due to its robustness against
coping mechanisms compared to the Blacklist Hard and Comprehensive 8 policies as well
as its resistance to loss of entropy through multiple disclosures of passwords.

5.4. Recommendations for Future Work
The coping mechanism using known information consisted of using a username as
a password and reusing old passwords in their entirety. These coping mechanisms can be
HDVLO\ SUHYHQWHG E\ EODFNOLVWLQJ XVHU¶V XVHUQDPHV IRU WKHLU VSHFLILF DFFRXQWV DQG DOO
previous passwords from being reused. This should be the first coping mechanism
eliminated due to the relative ease of implementation and low processing power required
to maintain security. Blacklisting passwords against reuse is not necessarily a standard
implementation for password authentication and not every developer considers security
when developing websites. So, developing a standard library that can be used to implement
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password authentication could serve to help secure many sites being developed by
individuals without extensive training in security.
Other more advanced detection mechanisms should be researched as well such as
the Levenshtein distance algorithm to try to prevent users from coping at password changes.
Other server side predictive mechanisms can be researched to prevent users from falling
into coping patterns by warning users to not use a password similar to their previous
passwords. But a balance must be found between processing requirements, wait time on
password change, and user memorability.
Further research should be done to develop a model that accurately represents the
cognitive load that passwords place on the human memory. This would allow policy
creators to more accurately estimate how much they are willing to stress or frustrate their
own user base with a certain policy. This will allow policy requirements to be chosen that
cater toward memorability and do not encourage coping mechanisms.
In the field of risk analysis, future work can be done to better gauge the long term
impact of mass password leakages and incorporate this into the risk framework for
organizations. This can help to serve to increase the number of options for system
DGPLQLVWUDWRUVZKRFXUUHQWO\RQO\UHVHWXVHUV¶SDVVZRUGVLQUHVSRQVHWRPDVVOHDNDJHV
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Appendix A. Survey Questions

Demographic Survey (Log In #1)
1. What is your gender?
x Male
x Female
2. What is your age?
x 18 ± 24
x 25 ± 34
x 35 ± 44
x 45 ± 54
x 55 ± 64
x 65+
3. Where were you born?
x North America
x Europe
x Asia
x South America
x Australia
x Africa
x Antarctica
4. What is your race?
x Caucasian
x African-American
x Asian
x American Indiana
x Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
x Hispanic
x Other
5. What is your marital status?
x Single
x Married
x Widowed
x Divorced
x Separated
6. What is your Ethnicity?
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x
x

Hispanic/Latino
Non-Hispanic/Latino

7. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
x High School (or equivalent)
x Technical/trade school completion
x Some college
x Undergraduate Degree
x Some Post Graduate Work
x Graduate Degree
x PhD
8. What is your primary occupation?
x Management
x Business and Financial Operations
x Computer and Mathematical
x Architecture and Engineering
x Life, Physical, and Social Science
x Community and Social Service
x Legal
x Education, Training, and Library
x Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media
x Healthcare Practitioner
x Healthcare Support
x Protective Service
x Food Service
x Building and Grounds, Cleaning and Maintenance
x Personal Care and Service
x Sales
x Office and Administrative Support
x Farming, Fishing, and Forestry
x Construction and Extraction
x Installation, Maintenance, and Repair
x Transportation and Material Moving
9. What is your income level?
x $0 - $15,000
x $15,001 - $25,000
x $25,001 - $40,000
x $40,001 - $60,000
x $60,001 - $80,000
x $80,001+
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Survey Log In #2
1. Were you affected by the Home Depot Breach?
x Yes
x No
2. Have you ever received a Data Breach Disclosure Notice?
x Yes
x No
3. Do you subscribe to Wired Magazine?
x Yes
x No
4. Do you read terms of service policies?
x Yes
x No

Survey Log In #3
1. Do you regularly back up your computer system? (Regularly means a minimum of
once per month)
x Yes
x No
2. If yes, please answer the following. If No, please proceed to number 3.
x Please indicate what you use for backing up your computer system.
o Cloud
o External Hard drive
o Other
3. Are you able to recognize phishing emails?
x Yes
x No
4. I am more concerned about my financial data then my health data?
x True
x False
5. Are you familiar with Stuxnet?
x Yes
x No
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Survey Log In #4
1. What computer operating system do you use?
x Windows
x Mac
x Linux
x Other
2. Do you use public WiFi to access secure accounts?
x Yes
x No
3. Are you concerned about cyber crime?
x Yes
x No
4. Were you affected by the Target breach?
x Yes
x No

Survey Log In #5
1. Which of the following do you have in your home? (please check all that apply)
x Smart cellular telephone
x Laptop computer
x Desktop computer
x Tablet
x Other
2. Are you concerned about identity theft?
x Yes
x No
3. Are you able to recognize spam emails?
x Yes
x No
4. Have you ever been a victim of a social engineering attack?
x Yes
x No
x 'RQ¶WNQRZ

53

Survey Log In #6
1. Do you reach computer acceptable use policies?
x Yes
x No
2. Have you ever received a phishing email?
x Yes
x No
3. Have you heard of Stop. Think. Connect?
x Yes
x No
4. Have you heard of Stop, Drop, and Roll?
x Yes
x No
Exit Survey with Password Specific Questions:
1. Did you utilize the same password in this exercise that you used on another
account?
x Yes
x No
If yes, please answer the following. If no, please skip to number 2.
At which point did you start using this similar password?
x Week 1
x Week 2
x Week 3
x Week 4
x Week 5
x Week 6
x Week 7
2. Did you utilize a similar password in this exercise that you used on another
account? Similar means using the same root word, or branch of the same
word, with a different prefix or suffix, different placement of capital letters,
different numbers, or different special characters.
x Yes
x No
If yes, please answer the following. If no, please skip to number 3.
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x
x
x
x
x
x
x

At which point did you start using this similar password?
Week 1
Week 2
Week 3
Week 4
Week 5
Week 6
Week 7

3. Did you write down a password during this exercise?
x Yes
x No
If yes, please answer the following. If no, please skip to number 4.
Only for this exercise, why did you write down your password
(please check all that apply):
x Too difficult to remember due to the policy requirements
x Too difficult to remember over multiple changes
x Too difficult to remember due to too many passwords
x Regularly write down my passwords
x Other __________________________
When did you first write down your password in this exercise? [Purdue
students]
x Week 1
x Week 3
x Week 5
x Week 7
x Week 9
x Week 11
x Week 13
When did you first write down your password in this exercise?
[Mechanical Turk]
x Week 1
x Week 2
x Week 3
x Week 4
x Week 5
x Week 6
x Week 7
4. Did you utilize any personal information to assist you in creating a password
in this exercise?
x Yes
x No
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If yes, please answer the following. If no, please skip to number 5.
What type of personal information did you use?
x 3HW¶VQDPH
x Street name where you grew up
x Date of birth
x Name of person with whom you are close
x Favorite sports team
x School where you attended
x Organization in which you are a member
x Vehicle you have or wish to have
x Other __________________________
5. Did you ever become frustrated by the password policy in this study?
x Yes
x No
6. Did you ever become frustrated by the frequency of password changes
required in this study?
x Yes
x No
7. What type of device did you use to log in to this study?
x Laptop computer
x Desktop computer
x Mobile phone
x Tablet
x Other ______________
8. In your previous experiences with passwords, have you ever been frustrated
by a password policy?
x Yes
x No
If yes, please answer the following. If no, please skip to number 9.
Was the policy that caused you frustration similar to any of the
following (please check all that apply)?
x Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for special characters
x Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for capital letters
x Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for numbers
x Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for numbers, capital
letters, and special characters
x Requirement that you not use any words found in a dictionary
x Other __________________________________
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9. Have you ever been frustrated by the frequency of password changes required
by any site?
x Yes
x No
If yes, please answer the following. If no, please skip to number 10.
x
x
x
x
x
x

How often were you required to change the password?
Every 30 days
Every 60 days
Every 90 days
Every 120 days
Every 180 days
Every 365 days

10. How many accounts do you use that have passwords.
x 0±5
x 6 ± 10
x 11 ± 15
x 16 ± 20
x 21 ± 25
x 25+
11. Have you ever slightly modified a password to comply with a change in
password policy within the same account?
x Yes
x No
12. Have you ever written down a password for any reason?
x Yes
x No
13. Have you ever used the same password to access multiple accounts?
x Yes
x No
Exit Survey with Password Specific Questions:
14. Did you utilize the same password in this exercise that you used on another
account?
x Yes
x No
If yes, please answer the following. If no, please skip to number 2.
At which point did you start using this similar password?
x Week 1
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x
x
x
x
x
x

Week 2
Week 3
Week 4
Week 5
Week 6
Week 7

15. Did you utilize a similar password in this exercise that you used on another
account? Similar means using the same root word, or branch of the same
word, with a different prefix or suffix, different placement of capital letters,
different numbers, or different special characters.
x Yes
x No
If yes, please answer the following. If no, please skip to number 3.
At which point did you start using this similar password?
x Week 1
x Week 2
x Week 3
x Week 4
x Week 5
x Week 6
x Week 7
16. Did you write down a password during this exercise?
x Yes
x No
If yes, please answer the following. If no, please skip to number 4.
Only for this exercise, why did you write down your password
(please check all that apply):
x Too difficult to remember due to the policy requirements
x Too difficult to remember over multiple changes
x Too difficult to remember due to too many passwords
x Regularly write down my passwords
x Other __________________________
When did you first write down your password in this exercise? [Purdue
students]
x Week 1
x Week 3
x Week 5
x Week 7
x Week 9
x Week 11
x Week 13
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When did you first write down your password in this exercise?
[Mechanical Turk]
x Week 1
x Week 2
x Week 3
x Week 4
x Week 5
x Week 6
x Week 7
17. Did you utilize any personal information to assist you in creating a password
in this exercise?
x Yes
x No
If yes, please answer the following. If no, please skip to number 5.
What type of personal information did you use?
x 3HW¶VQDPH
x Street name where you grew up
x Date of birth
x Name of person with whom you are close
x Favorite sports team
x School where you attended
x Organization in which you are a member
x Vehicle you have or wish to have
x Other __________________________
18. Did you ever become frustrated by the password policy in this study?
x Yes
x No
19. Did you ever become frustrated by the frequency of password changes
required in this study?
x Yes
x No
20. What type of device did you use to log in to this study?
x Laptop computer
x Desktop computer
x Mobile phone
x Tablet
x Other ______________
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21. In your previous experiences with passwords, have you ever been frustrated
by a password policy?
x Yes
x No
If yes, please answer the following. If no, please skip to number 9.
Was the policy that caused you frustration similar to any of the
following (please check all that apply)?
x Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for special characters
x Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for capital letters
x Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for numbers
x Minimum of eight characters with a requirement for numbers, capital
letters, and special characters
x Requirement that you not use any words found in a dictionary
x Other __________________________________
22. Have you ever been frustrated by the frequency of password changes required
by any site?
x Yes
x No
If yes, please answer the following. If no, please skip to number 10.
x
x
x
x
x
x

How often were you required to change the password?
Every 30 days
Every 60 days
Every 90 days
Every 120 days
Every 180 days
Every 365 days

23. How many accounts do you use that have passwords?
x 0±5
x 6 ± 10
x 11 ± 15
x 16 ± 20
x 21 ± 25
x 25+
24. Have you ever slightly modified a password to comply with a change in
password policy within the same account?
x Yes
x No
25. Have you ever written down a password for any reason?
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x
x

Yes
No

26. Have you ever used the same password to access multiple accounts?
x Yes
x No
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The Department Head (or authorized agent) has read and approved the application. S/he affirms that the use
of human subjects in this project is relevant to answer the research question being asked and has scientific
or scholarly merit. Additionally s/he agrees to maintain research records in accordancH ZLWK WKH ,5%¶V
research records retention requirement should the principal investigator terminate association with the
University.
___________________________________
_________________________________________
Department Head (printed)

Department Name

___________________________________
_________________________________________
Department Head Signature

Date

APPLICATION TO USE HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS

9. This project will be conducted at the following location(s): (please indicate city & state)
X

Purdue West Lafayette Campus
Purdue Regional Campus (Specify):
Other (Specify):

10. If this project will involve potentially vulnerable subject populations, please check all that apply.
Minors under age 18
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Pregnant Women
Fetus/fetal tissue
Prisoners Or Incarcerated Individuals
X

University Students (PSYC Dept. subject pool ___)
Elderly Persons
Economically/Educationally Disadvantaged Persons
Mentally/Emotionally/Developmentally Disabled Persons
Minority Groups and/or Non-English Speakers
Intervention(s) that include medical or psychological treatment

11.

Indicate the anticipated maximum number of subjects to be enrolled in this protocol as justified by the
hypothesis and study procedures: 2,000______________

12.

This project involves the use of an Investigational New Drug (IND) or an Approved Drug For An
Unapproved Use.
YES

X NO

Drug name, IND number and company:
13.

This project involves the use of an Investigational Medical Device or an Approved Medical Device
For An Unapproved Use.
YES

X NO

Device name, IDE number and company:
14.

The project involves the use of Radiation or Radioisotopes:
YES

15.

X NO

Does this project call for: (check-mark all that apply to this study)
Use of Voice, Video, Digital, or Image Recordings?

X

Subject Compensation? Please indicate the maximum payment amount to subjects. $2.00
3XUGXH¶V+XPDQ6XEMHFWV3D\PHQW3ROLF\

Participant Payment Disclosure Form
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VO2 Max Exercise?
More Than Minimal Risk?
Waiver of Informed Consent?
Extra Costs To Subjects?
The Use of Blood?

Total Amount of Blood

Over Time Period (days)
The Use of rDNA or Biohazardous materials?
The Use of Human Tissue or Cell Lines?
The Use of Other Fluids that Could Mask the Presence of Blood (Including Urine and Feces)?
The Use of Protected Health Information (Obtained from Healthcare Practitioners or Institutions)?
The Use of academic records?
16.

Does investigator or key personnel have a potential financial or other conflict of interest in this study?
YES

X NO
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APPLICATION NARRATIVE

A.

PROPOSED RESEARCH RATIONALE

Ɣ

Password policies have become so stringent and cumbersome that users may stop

creating strong passwords or enlist coping mechanisms, such as writing down their passwords or
using them across multiple websites, to facilitate remembering them. These coping methods have
the potential to undermine and weaken the effectiveness of these password policies. Password
policies, like those that require eight digits with at least one being a capital letter, one being a
number, and one being a special character, are designed as authentication methods for access into
DVSHFLILFSURJUDPZHEVLWHRURWKHUVHFXUHDUHD:HDUHLQWHUHVWHGLQDQDO\]LQJXVHUV¶EHKDYLRU
when creating passwords within these policies. It is our theory that it is possible to identify a
policy that eliminates or severely decreases coping methods while retaining significant strength.
Additionally, we intend to collect fairly comprehensive demographic and user behavior data as we
anticipate future analysis by other investigators.

B.
Ɣ

SPECIFIC PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED

Each participant will be required to log in to a website. At the initial log in, each user

will be assigned one password policy to create a password within. In addition, the participant will
be required to answer a survey indicating demographic information. During six of the subsequent
log ins, the user will be required to change his or her password and answer a short survey of
questions on information security. At the time of the last log in, the user will be requested to
participate in a survey that will inquire into any coping mechanisms that were utilized throughout
the study or frustrations that the user experienced.

Ɣ

The data collected will be the demographic information of the participants, the specific
passwords
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that were created, and the answers to the surveys.

C.

SUBJECTS TO BE INCLUDED
Describe:
Ɣ

The subjects will be students at Purdue University. There will be no additional
requirements for inclusion.

Ɣ

There is no exclusion criteria for subjects.

Ɣ

The maximum number of subjects we seek approval to enroll is 1,000. We anticipate

only a Thirty Percent participation rate, so our final subject pool will likely be approximately
Three Hundred per collection method.

D.

RECRUITMENT OF SUBJECTS AND OBTAINING INFORMED CONSENT
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

E.

Certain courses at Purdue will be participating in the project, and each student will be
advised that for attendance purposes, he or she will be required to log in to a website after
each class to answer one question from lecture that day
The students will be advised that a password study is also being completed, and will be
given the opportunity to participate
Each student will log in each day he or she is scheduled to attend that course.
Upon the initial log in, the student will be randomly assigned to a password policy, and
will be required to create a password that satisfies that policy.
If the student is participating in the study, his or her password will be collected and he or
she will be requested to participate in an initial survey to collect demographic data.
Every two weeks, over a fourteen week period, every student will be required to change
his or her password for the website (for a total of seven passwords to be created)
The passwords of the students who are participating will be collected and analyzed
At the end of the data collection, the students will be invited to participate in a survey
regarding any coping mechanisms used throughout the study

PROCEDURES FOR PAYMENT OF SUBJECTS
Ɣ

There will be no financial compensation for participation in the study.

Ɣ

Purdue University Professors will be able to award extra credit to participating students,

so long as the non-participating students are also awarded a non-related extra credit opportunity for
the same amount of points that takes a similar amount of effort as participation in the study.

F.

CONFIDENTIALITY
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Ɣ

The investigators do not anticipate having or keeping any names, telephone numbers, or

email addresses of the participants. Each user will be given a random identification number. The
LQYHVWLJDWRUVZLOOQRWKDYHDFFHVVWRWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶QDPHVRQO\WKLVDVVLJQHGQXPEHU7KHLQLWLDO
list of names that connects to the user identification number for Purdue students will be held by Dr.
Melissa Dark and Dr. Christopher Foreman in a secure location.
Ɣ

G.

Attached to this application is the Data Management Plan.

POTENTIAL RISKS TO SUBJECTS
Ɣ

The potential risk is minimal, in that no personal identifying information will be utilized
by the

investigators.
Ɣ

It is likely that the participants will use a password throughout the process that might be
used in

another aspect of their lives. The participants will be advised of this before data is utilized, and it
will be
suggested that if the password used was not unique, that he or she may wish to change the other
passwords
that are similar. The participants will also be granted the opportunity to not have their passwords
analyzed
once the data collection has been complete and the full study explained.

H.

BENEFITS TO BE GAINED BY THE INDIVIDUAL AND/OR SOCIETY
Ɣ

Each of the subjects will have the opportunity to reflect on his or her own password

selection, and how it might be advantageous to utilize stronger passwords throughout their lives.
Ɣ
believe our

Society is very dependent upon authentication measures such as passwords, but we
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study will indicate that passwords are a very weak type of such measures. Society as a whole will
hopefully
observe the results and begin seriously looking at alternative or supplemental authentication
measures.

I.

INV(67,*$725¶6(9$/8$7,212)7+(5,6.-BENEFIT RATIO
Ɣ

J.

WRITTEN INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Ɣ

K.

The risk involved is no greater than that involved in every day life.

The Informed Consent Forms are attached to this Application.

WAIVER OF INFORMED CONSENT OR SIGNED CONSENT
If requesting either a waiver of consent or a waiver of signed consent, please address the following:
1. We are not requesting a waiver of consent.

L.

INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH
Our research will not be international

M.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
Ɣ

Attached are copies of the surveys to be completed at the beginning and end of the study
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Appendix C. Statistical Analysis System (SAS) Code
options ls=72;
goptions colors=(none);

data NISTcomprehsive8iteration1;
input NISTEntropy1;
datalines;
;
data NISTcomprehsive8iteration2;
input NISTEntropy2;
datalines;
;
data NISTcomprehsive8iteration3;
input NISTEntropy3;
datalines;
;
data NISTcomprehsive8iteration4;
input NISTEntropy4;
datalines;
;
data NISTcomprehsive8iteration5;
input NISTEntropy5;
datalines;

70
;
data NISTcomprehsive8iteration6;
input NISTEntropy6;
datalines;
;
data NISTcomprehsive8iteration7;
input NISTEntropy7;
datalines;
;

data NISTblacklistHarditeration1;
input NISTEntropy1;
datalines;
;
data NISTblacklistHarditeration2;
input NISTEntropy2;
datalines;
;
data NISTblacklistHarditeration3;
input NISTEntropy3;
datalines;
;
data NISTblacklistHarditeration4;

71
input NISTEntropy4;
datalines;
;
data NISTblacklistHarditeration5;
input NISTEntropy5;
datalines;
;
data NISTblacklistHarditeration6;
input NISTEntropy6;
datalines;
;
data NISTblacklistHarditeration7;
input NISTEntropy7;
datalines;
;

data NISTbasic16iteration1;
input NISTEntropy1;
datalines;
;
data NISTbasic16iteration2;
input NISTEntropy2;
datalines;
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;
data NISTbasic16iteration3;
input NISTEntropy3;
datalines;
;
data NISTbasic16iteration4;
input NISTEntropy4;
datalines;
;
data NISTbasic16iteration5;
input NISTEntropy5;
datalines;
;
data NISTbasic16iteration6;
input NISTEntropy6;
datalines;
;
data NISTbasic16iteration7;
input NISTEntropy7;
datalines;
;

data comprehensive8iteration1;
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input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST1;
datalines;
;
data comprehensive8iteration2;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST2;
datalines;
;
data comprehensive8iteration3;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST3;
datalines;
;
data comprehensive8iteration4;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST4;
datalines;
;
data comprehensive8iteration5;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST5;
datalines;
;
data comprehensive8iteration6;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST6;
datalines;
;
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data comprehensive8iteration7;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST7;
datalines;
;

data BlacklistHarditeration1;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST1;
datalines;
;
data BlacklistHarditeration2;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST2;
datalines;
;
data BlacklistHarditeration3;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST3;
datalines;
;
data BlacklistHarditeration4;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST4;
datalines;
;
data BlacklistHarditeration5;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST5;

75
datalines;
;
data BlacklistHarditeration6;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST6;
datalines;
;
data BlacklistHarditeration7;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST7;
datalines;
;

data basic16iteration1;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST1;
datalines;
;
data basic16iteration2;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST2;
datalines;
;
data basic16iteration3;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST3;
datalines;
;
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data basic16iteration4;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST4;
datalines;
;
data basic16iteration5;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST5;
datalines;
;
data basic16iteration6;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST6;
datalines;
;
data basic16iteration7;
input PostCopingEntropyAndNIST7;
datalines;
;

proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTcomprehsive8iteration1;
var NISTEntropy1;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTcomprehsive8iteration2;
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var NISTEntropy2;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTcomprehsive8iteration3;
var NISTEntropy3;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTcomprehsive8iteration4;
var NISTEntropy4;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTcomprehsive8iteration5;
var NISTEntropy5;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTcomprehsive8iteration6;
var NISTEntropy6;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTcomprehsive8iteration7;
var NISTEntropy7;
run;

proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTblacklistHarditeration1;
var NISTEntropy1;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTblacklistHarditeration2;
var NISTEntropy2;
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run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTblacklistHarditeration3;
var NISTEntropy3;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTblacklistHarditeration4;
var NISTEntropy4;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTblacklistHarditeration5;
var NISTEntropy5;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTblacklistHarditeration6;
var NISTEntropy6;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=NISTblacklistHarditeration7;
var NISTEntropy7;
run;

proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=NISTbasic16iteration1;
var NISTEntropy1;
run;
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=NISTbasic16iteration2;
var NISTEntropy2;
run;
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proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=NISTbasic16iteration3;
var NISTEntropy3;
run;
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=NISTbasic16iteration4;
var NISTEntropy4;
run;
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=NISTbasic16iteration5;
var NISTEntropy5;
run;
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=NISTbasic16iteration6;
var NISTEntropy6;
run;
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=NISTbasic16iteration7;
var NISTEntropy7;
run;

proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensive8iteration1;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST1;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensive8iteration2;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST2;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensive8iteration3;
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var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST3;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensive8iteration4;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST4;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensive8iteration5;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST5;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensive8iteration6;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST6;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensive8iteration7;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST7;
run;

proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=BlacklistHarditeration1;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST1;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=BlacklistHarditeration2;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST2;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=BlacklistHarditeration3;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST3;
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run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=BlacklistHarditeration4;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST4;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=BlacklistHarditeration5;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST5;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=BlacklistHarditeration6;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST6;
run;
proc ttest H0=24 alpha=0.05 data=BlacklistHarditeration7;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST7;
run;

proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=basic16iteration1;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST1;
run;
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=basic16iteration2;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST2;
run;
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=basic16iteration3;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST3;
run;
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proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=basic16iteration4;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST4;
run;
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=basic16iteration5;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST5;
run;
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=basic16iteration6;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST6;
run;
proc ttest H0=30 alpha=0.05 data=basic16iteration7;
var PostCopingEntropyAndNIST7;
run;

data comprehensiv8blacklisthard;
input group entropy;
datalines;
;
run;
data blacklisthardBasic16;
input group entropy;
datalines;
;
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run;
 WHVWVLIWKHWZRJURXSVDUHHTXDOZHZDQWWKHOLQHWKDWVD\V³'LII´IRUWKH&RQILGHQFH
Interval and the line tKDWVD\V³6DWWHUWKZDLWH´IRUWKHWHVW 
proc ttest H0=0 alpha=0.05 data=comprehensiv8blacklisthard;
class group;
var entropy;
run;
proc ttest H0=0 alpha=0.05 data=blacklisthardBasic16;
class group;
var entropy;
run;

